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Motsamai Molefe
Department of Philosophy, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
ABSTRACT
This article invokes the idea of personhood (which it takes to be at the heart of Afro-
communitarian morality) to give an account of corrective/rectification justice. The idea of
rectification justice by Robert Nozick is used heuristically to reveal the moral-theoretical
resources availed by the idea of personhood to think about historical injustices and what
would constitute a meaningful remedy for them. This notion of personhood has three
facets: (1) a theory of moral status/dignity, (2) an account of historical conditions and (3)
the achievement of moral excellence by the agent (personhood). This article argues that a
just society is a function of (1) and (2), and it further argues that the aim of rectification
justice is to correct these two facets of a society, which are necessary for (3) to be possible.
The aim of correcting history just is to make personhood a possibility for all humanity,
particularly of those who were victims of past injustices.
Introduction
How will Afro-communitarianism approach the question of historical injustices occasioned
by colonisation and apartheid? In other words, moral-theoretically, what corpus will it
provide for thinking about restorative/rectification justice? This article responds to these
questions by relying on the normative notion of personhood, which is at the heart of
Afro-communitarianism, to account for rectification justice (Gyekye 1997; Wiredu 2008).
Moral-theoretically, according to Robert Nozick (2002), justice can be concerned about
three distinct moral issues, namely: (1) it can be about permissible initial acquisition of
things; (2) a permissible transfer of things between individuals and (3) it can be about cor-
recting historical violations of the two previous forms of justice–rectification justification.1
The primary aim of this article is to unpack the three facets that constitute this Afro-
communitarian moral notion of personhood, specifically: (1) the historical facet of this
moral notion, which prizes certain historical conditions as crucial for the attainment of per-
sonhood; (2) the capacity in virtue of which human beings are intrinsically valuable (the
idea of moral status/dignity) and (3) the achievement facet of this notion. My interest in
this analysis is to accentuate the facet of historical conditions and the capacity for
virtue possessed by human beings as important in both moral-political philosophy, in
general, and also, more specifically, for accounting for (rectification) justice. In other
words, at the heart of my argument is the idea that to take seriously personhood
commits one necessarily (1) to holding the view that particular historical conditions
ought to prevail for it to be possible and (2) that one holds a particular conception of
human nature that grounds our belief that individuals can attain it (some human capacity
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definitive of human dignity), without which a talk of personhood is nothing but a sham. A
meaningful talk of personhood requires these two facets as its preconditions.
On the other hand, to talk of rectification justice necessarily implies an evaluation of
some historical conditions to be flawed so as to require correction. So, both the notions
of personhood and rectification justice are concerned essentially about certain historical
conditions as robust features of moral-political thinking. This article, therefore, brings to
the fore the backward-looking facet of morality (of personhood) that is generally not
emphasised in African ethics. It is this backward-looking facet of personhood that is cap-
tured by (1) and (2) that links it to rectification justice – these conditions will specify the
moral-political content that should inform the process of remedying the past.
In this article, I do not intend to defend either the plausibility of the moral notion of
personhood in its own right or to even suggest it as the only/best way to think about
past (injustices) in the African tradition.2 I limit myself to two aims. Firstly, my aim is to
extend discourse on this crucial notion of personhood to untrodden academic terrains.
The literature has generally tended to focus on personhood as a status attained by a
human being, i.e. as the moral end or final value (Menkiti 1984; Gyekye 1992, 1997;
Wiredu 1992, 2009). It has tended, however, to neglect the facet of human nature (her
capacity for virtue) and the historical conditions, which are preconditions that are necess-
ary for the attainment of personhood. It is these facets that constitute the nib and hub of
thinking about justice in this moral-political system. Even promising elucidations of this
notion by scholars like Kevin Behrens (2013) and Anthony Oyowe (2014) ultimately
focus on their analysis of personhood as a moral end. Jason Van Niekerk analysis of this
notion as a moral theory is important, but it also focuses on moral ends, the achievement
of a particular moral character.
I extend discourse on this notion of personhood by specifically pursuing its implications
with regards to the rationale it offers us for thinking about rectification justice. To do so,
instead of focusing on personhood as a moral end, I focus on moral-political consider-
ations that are necessary for its possibility. To the best of my knowledge, no one in the
literature has invoked this idea of personhood to reflect on what it might offer us in
terms of addressing historical injustices, backward-looking duties, or, how it might
inform our attempts to account for rectification justice. As such, the aim of this analysis
is to extend the discourse of personhood to this neglected facet of political thought in
African philosophy.
It is crucial to note that much of the literature in African moral philosophy largely
ignores this question of historical injustices in their analysis. Consider, for example, influ-
ential texts in African ethics tend to neglect considering how their moral theories might
speak to issues of historical injustices. Kwasi Wiredu (1992), one of the most influential
African philosophers, writes an excellent article ‘Moral Foundations of an African
Culture’; but never directly reflects on how it might speak to the problem of historical injus-
tices. For another, consider Augustine Shutte’s (2001) ethical elucidation on the moral prin-
ciple to inform the new South Africa, a country with a terrible history of colonisation and
apartheid. This book, make no mistake, offers important insights into moral thinking
drawing from ubuntu; but it remains mum on the question of the past and how to
approach it.
More recently, Kwame Gyekye (2010) writes an encyclopedic article titled ‘African
ethics’. This article explores meta-ethical questions, the moral idea of brotherhood, the
2 M. MOLEFE
idea of personhood, the duty-based nature of African ethics and many other topics; but it
also overlooks the issue of the past as crucial to African ethics. The mere history of African
people recommends the past as worth taking seriously morally and politically. This article
is an attempt to speak to this lacuna in African moral-political thought in African philos-
ophy, by directly speaking to historical injustices in the light of the ethical notion of
personhood.3
One major limitation of the analysis to proceed here is that it is cursory at best. The aim
is to extend an African moral notion of personhood, so as to explore its possible contri-
bution to the question of historical injustices. The fact that the analysis, here, is cursory,
should not be seen as a weakness, but should rather be considered as an invitation for
scholars in the tradition of African philosophy to join in and contribute to the moral-pol-
itical thinking on how to respond to Africa’s difficult past.
To make my analytical explorations between personhood and rectification justice, I
structure this article as follows. In the first section, I clarify the idea of personhood
central to this project. I do so by distinguishing four distinct concepts of personhood in
African philosophy. In the light of these conceptual distinctions of the notions of person-
hood, I suggest a connection between the patient-centred and agent-centred notions in
accounting for justice. Secondly, I proceed to unfold the ethical theory usually associated
with this idea – a self-realisation moral theory. Finally, I proceed to argue that the two
conditions necessary for personhood are at the heart of what is crucial for thinking
about rectification justice, namely: (1) what is special about human nature (dignity) and
(2) socio-historical conditions (common good).
Concepts of personhood in African philosophy
I identify at least four distinct concepts of personhood in African philosophy. Talk of per-
sonhood could refer to (1) the mere fact that one is a human being (Kaphagawani 2004);
(2) it may concern facts about what social and/or psychological factors are crucial for
accounting for personal identity (Mbiti 1969; Molefe 2016); (3) it may concern onto-
moral feature(s) that distinguish some beings as bearers of moral status (Toscano 2011;
Behrens 2013) and (4) it may indicate those moral agents who are leading morally
genuine lives (Menkiti 1984; Wiredu 1992, 2004; Gyekye 1992; Ikuenobe 2006).
It is crucial to note that the first two concepts of ‘personhood’ are metaphysical insofar
as they specify certain descriptive facts as the basis for (1) understanding what it means to
be human as opposed to being a table or a grain of sand and (2) facts concerning how to
account for personal identity. In this kind of analysis, no moral considerations are invoked
or even necessary. The last two notions of a person, however, are normative; in other
words, they invoke some moral value as a basis for determining the status of personhood.
It is crucial to note, however, that here we are dealing with two distinct normative
notions of personhood and these notions play two distinct roles in moral philosophy.
One is riveted on an invariable property possessed usually by human beings in virtue of
which they deserve our moral regard, which Kevin Behrens refers to as the patient-
centred notion of personhood (Metz 2013, 12; Behrens 2013). Thus, to talk of a human
being as a possessor of moral status is tantamount to specifying some ontological
POLITIKON 3
feature in virtue of which she is morally significant and for the very reason of possessing,
note, not exercising, this feature, she deserves moral respect (Toscano 2011).
The last notion of personhood invokes respect that accrues variably among moral
agents relative to their performance, which Behrens refers to as the agent-centred
notion of personhood (Menkiti 2004; Metz 2013). Those who perform well are called
‘persons’ and those that do not are ‘non-persons’. To call a human being a ‘person’, in
this last sense, it is to make a moral judgement that she is leading a true or even a gen-
uinely human life (Wiredu 2009). It is, however, not to deny or to denigrate her humanity
qua a biological fact; it is rather to say she is not treating her humanity in the best way
possible, morally speaking (Gyekye 1992; Wiredu 2009). Personhood, in this light, is a
moral achievement that depends on the agent’s performance.
So, the first normative notion of a person speaks of the respect one deserves merely
because she possesses the relevant ontological capacity, be it rationality, sentience or
capabilities (Darwall 1977); and the other, it refers to respect one earns relative to her per-
formance (Menkiti 2004).4 Behrens, in his analysis, notes that the patient-centred notion is
prevalent in the Western moral tradition and the agent-centred notion is prevalent in
African moral tradition. I depart from the point of view that tethers these two notions
to account for justice.5 That is, we believe one can achieve personhood (agent-centred)
because they possess the capacity for it (patient-centred).
The tethering of these two notions is important because political discussions of justice
entirely rely on the patient-centred notion of personhood as it is based on the principles of
equal respect that owe to all human beings (Dworkin 1983; Kymlicka 1990). The idea of
equality is crucial for justice because it departs from the fact that there is no moral
basis to think there are human beings who are more human than others; or, the idea
that no one’s rights, all things being equal, should count more than those of others
(Rachels and Rachels 2015, 13–14). But, here, I think about (rectification) justice in the
light of these two notions because they are inherently interlinked to each other
(Gyekye 1992). Our moral belief that one can attain personhood relies precisely on what
we believe to be at the heart of what makes a human being morally special or superlatively
valuable (dignity), which is pivotal for thinking about a just society.
Thus, to take the agent-centred notion of personhood seriously commits one to the
view that the ability/capacity for moral agency grounds our conception of moral
status.6 It is this background theory of moral status qua capacity for moral agency that
will be doing much of the job of accounting for justice in this article. So, a talk of person-
hood as something that is achieved – a variable property that tracks performance –
depends entirely on (1) the human capacity for moral agency and (2) the social
conditions/opportunities that prevail for this attainment to be possible in the first place.
The fact that the relationship between (1) and (2) is crucial for explaining how agents
come to attain personhood is usually ignored in the literature, though Gyekye (1992,
1997) somewhat approximates it, but never delves into it. I rely on (1) and (2) to build a
case for rectification justice in moral-political philosophy.
Personhood and ethical theory
To say one is a person is one and the same thing as making the moral judgement that they
are morally virtuous – a judgement about the quality of their characters. Thus, to talk of
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personhood essentially involves or implies reliance on some system of value (Wiredu 2009;
Gyekye 2010). In fact, Gyekye (2010) states: ‘The concept of a person in African thought
embodies ethical presuppositions’. Wiredu (2009, 15) goes even further to comment on
the scope of these ethical presuppositions embodied by this idea of personhood, thus:
But such evaluation presupposes a system of values. Since the context of such evaluations is
nothing short of the entire sphere of human relations, the system of values presupposed cannot
be anything short of an ethic for a whole society or culture.
It is clear from the above that the idea of personhood embodies an ethical system that
informs Afro-communitarianism. In other words, at the heart of Afro-communitarian
ethical systems is the idea of personhood and, in turn, this idea contains values whose
purview extends to the entire sphere of human relations. Or, put differently, if one
wants to understand Afro-communitarianism they must appeal to the notion of person-
hood since it embodies an ethic for a whole (African) society.
For example, Gyekye (1992, 109) gives insights into this system of value, thus:
The pursuit or practice of moral virtue is held as intrinsic to the conception of a person. The
position here may thus be schematized as: for any p, if p is a person, then p in his conduct
ought to display norms and ideals of personhood.
It is crucial to note that here Gyekye construes personhood in terms of the pursuit of moral
virtue or the very practice of moral virtue. In other words, one who counts as a person is
one whose deportment is characterised by certain virtues that reﬂects the quality of their
character. It is therefore not surprising to read Behrens (2013, 111) making sense of per-
sonhood in terms of ‘developing (moral) virtue’. In other words, the idea of personhood
posits the achievement of moral virtue as the proper moral goal. Or, as Metz (2007, 331)
construes, personhood to be tantamount to a self-realisation approach to ethics, wherein
the moral agent is expected to achieve a status of moral virtue. The goal is for the moral
agent to take that which was biologically given, and convert it to a morally virtuous
humanity (Menkiti 1984, 172; Bujo 2001, 88). Augustine Shutte (2001, 14) captures this
ethic thus:
The moral life is seen as a process of personal growth…Our deepest moral obligation is to
become more fully human. And this means entering more and more deeply into community
with others. So although the goal is personal fulfilment, selfishness is excluded.
And, one who has attained this status is described by Desmond Tutu (1999), famous for
chairing South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in these terms:
When we want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu, u nobuntu’; ‘Hey, so-and-so has
ubuntu.’ Then you are generous, you are hospitable, you are friendly and caring and compas-
sionate. You share what you have. It is to say, ‘My humanity is caught up’, is inextricably bound
up in yours.
To say some human being has ubuntu is one and the same thing as to say she is a person. A
human being that is leading a morally appreciable life is described in terms of having
ubuntu (Munyaka and Mothlabi, 2009, 65). It is for this reason that ubuntu is invoked as
a response to or as a moral judgement that afﬁrms the quality of one’s character or
conduct. It is worth noting that one who is a person is characterised by certain virtues
like generosity, hospitality, friendliness and compassion, among others. More, the moral
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virtues associated with a person are strictly relational ones; in other words, these are
virtues that throw one into relationships with others. Thus, one important facet of the
ethics presupposed by the idea of personhood is that the moral agent must develop
and manifest certain relational virtues (Metz 2012a). The goal is for the moral agent ‘to
become a full person, a real self, or a genuine human being’ (Metz 2009, 83).
But, there is another facet of this system of values. Above, we have been considering
the moral goal posited by this system. Some scholars have brought it to our attention
that there is also the side of means – the how part – associated with the idea of person-
hood (Metz 2013; Tshivhase 2013). Yes, the goal of morality is the attainment of person-
hood or the perfection of our humanity; but, then, we still have another crucial
question to consider: how do we achieve this goal? There is a consensus in the literature
that personhood is achieved through entering into relationships with others. For example,
Justice Yvonne Mokgoro (1998, 3) suggests how personhood is achieved when she
comments:
… thus the notion umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu/motho ke motho ka batho ba bangwe, which
also implies that during one’s life-time, one is constantly challenged by others, practically, to
achieve self-fulfilment through a set of collective social ideals.
An inﬂuential Kenyan Theologian from, Benezet Bujo (1997, 28), comments:
It is exactly the community which enables the self-realisation of the individual. According to
the African representation of values, it is not possible to achieve the ethical ideal individually
or as a strictly personal achievement.
Metz (2012a, 102) also informs us that
… self-realisation is exhausted through other persons’, that is, through community alone. It is
typical for African theorists to maintain, or at least to suggest, that the only comprehensive
respect in which one can live a genuinely human way of life is by communing, or sometimes
‘being in harmony’, with other people.
From the above, one can only achieve personal-moral perfection by being ‘constantly chal-
lenged by others’ or by being enabled by the community or by ‘being in harmony’ with
others. There is no denial that personal-moral perfection is an individual effort, though
this fact is not usually emphasised in the literature, but what comes out clearly is that
some form of constant, continual and positive interaction with others is crucial for the
attainment of personhood. One such crucial feature of this harmonious engagement
with others is the exercise of the other-regarding duties. For example, Wiredu (1992,
200) informs us that one can only become a person relative to the extent that she pro-
motes the welfare of others in the community. David Lutz (2009, 314) also informs us
that the promotion of the common good – the good of others – entails the promotion
of the good of an individual as well, the individual attaining her own personhood.
It is for this reason that Gyekye (2004, 2010) has maintained that Afro-communitarian-
ism is best construed as a social ethic characterised essentially by promoting the good of
others in the community. Commenting on this ethic, Gyekye (2010) notes: ‘African social
ethic… emphasize(s) the importance of the values of mutual helpfulness, collective
responsibility, cooperation, interdependence, and reciprocal obligations’. Gyekye further
notes:
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Social or community life itself, a robust feature of the African communitarian society, man-
dates a morality that clearly is weighted on duty to others and to the community; it constitutes
the foundation for moral responsibilities and obligations.
So, from the above we see that this moral idea of personhood has two facets. Firstly, the
goal of this ethical system is for the agent to realise or become a genuine human being or
to be morally virtuous; and, secondly, we get a clear sense that one can realise this status
(of personhood) only by entering into relationships with others, wherein she exercises
duties to promote their well-being. It is to be kept in mind, though not demonstrated,
that the common good is believed to entail the goal of the agent or that the common
good does not threaten or undermine the goal of the individual to realise her true human-
ity (Gyekye 1995, 156; Lutz 2009, 314).
Translated to a principle of right action an Afro-communitarian ethic reads as:
An action is right just insofar as it positively relates to others and thereby realizes oneself; an
act is wrong to the extent that it does not perfect one’s valuable nature as a social being (Metz
2007, 331).
I proceed in what follows to philosophically articulate how the past matters in the light of
an Afro-communitarian ethic of personhood.
Personhood and moral-political philosophy (Justice)
I have demonstrated that to talk of personhood is to talk of the agent’s status of moral
excellence. This achievement facet of personhood is obvious and has been elaborated
upon extensively in the literature. Here, however, I proceed to focus on two facets of it
related to rectification justice that have largely been neglected. Firstly, to take personhood
seriously implies that one holds a particular conception about what is special about human
nature – a position that has been discussed by Gyekye. Secondly, to take seriously this idea
of personhood is tantamount to taking history and socio-historical conditions to be crucial
for this kind of a judgement to be meaningful at all.
For one to make the judgement that some agent has achieved personhood, certain
socio-historical conditions must hold for the judgement to be valid in the first place. I dis-
tinguish between history and historical conditions to bring our attention to the fact that to
make the judgement that one is a person implies two sorts of related socio-historical con-
ditions. Firstly, it implies that the making of this judgement requires an assessment of the
agent’s conduct over time (history); and, secondly, it also implies that the agent is living in
a society that avails basic goods she requires to be able to achieve the ideals associated
with what is required for her humanity to be perfected. In what follows, I elaborate on
these two facets of this notion of personhood with the aim of relating them to rectification
justice.
Personhood and history
I think the intuition that backward-looking considerations should become a crucial facet of
a robust moral theory is sustainable. Here, I do not defend why I take this intuition to be
plausible. I am content to function on the basis of common sense morality. Two examples
will suffice as prima facie evidence for why I take this intuition to be uncontroversial or
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even reasonable. Think about the activity of promise-making. The promiser develops a
special relationship with the promisee by merely making the promise. The promisee,
merely because of the promise, now has the right to demand that the promiser deliver
her promise. The duty of the promiser to the promisee is riveted in the past, the mere
fact that he promised. It is precisely because of this past action of making a promise, on
the part of the promiser, that the promisee finds herself justified to press demands that
one should fulfil their promise. Taking seriously the activity of promise-keeping commits
one to taking seriously the intuition that past actions or decisions are an important
feature of a robust moral thinking.
For another useful example, think about how to distribute scarce medicine for mana-
ging HIV/AIDS.7 Suppose we have a case of a trade-off and we can only give the medi-
cation to one of the two. And, suppose we have historical facts with regards to how
patients got infected with the virus. If the woman was infected by her husband and the
husband was promiscuous then, it seems on the basis of this historical consideration,
we are justified to give the medicine to the woman since she is a victim and, in some
important sense, it was not her own doing that led to her infection. Here, all things
being equal, we are justified to appeal to the past actions and decisions to discriminate
in terms of distributing some goods. How people have behaved in the past should
affect how we distribute scarce medication, particularly in conditions of scarcity.
It is crucial to note that these two examples appear to be strongly pointing to the direc-
tion that historical considerations ought to matter in moral thinking. In other words, here
we get the sense that some duties, responsibilities or even rights emerge because of this
backward-looking facet of morality as roughly represented by the two examples above.
We can, on the basis of this prima facie evidence, set our faces against any moral theory
that does not have this backward-looking facet in its decision making.8 It is this back-
ward-looking facet that features essentially in rectification justice.
Rectification justice is an attempt to correct historical violations involved in unjust
acquisitions and transfers. But this kind of correction anticipated by rectification justice
would not make sense if the past and its correction are not important part of moral theor-
isation. In other words, if rectification justice is true, it implies that we have a duty to be
concerned about the past to the point that it recommends some remedy. In what
follows, below, I unfold how the past is an important facet of this notion of personhood.
To judge some person to be a person is to evaluate them to be truly leading a life befit-
ting a human being. In the African tradition, it is a crucial consideration to achieve the
status of being a moral exemplar, and it is no small matter to fail in this regard (Wiredu
1992, 199; 2009, 14). Wiredu (1992, 200–201) even goes to the point of claiming that
this project of attaining personhood is the highest goal of life in African traditional
thought. To make the judgement that some human being has either attained personhood
or not is to be necessarily involved in a moral evaluation that cannot be divorced from the
history of the agent under moral scrutiny. In other words, to judge some human being as a
person is tantamount to making a moral evaluation about the agent’s conduct over time.
To attain moral perfection one has to live a particular kind of a life and that life, in turn,
must produce a particular kind of character. Menkiti (2004, 326) speaks of human life as
imagined in terms of a ‘journey of the individual toward personhood’. The one who
makes the judgement about one’s status then relies on the record of the agent’s life to
arrive at the decision that she is a person. In other words, the one making the judgement
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must be aware of the agent’s moral journey and how she conducted herself in this moral
journey. The issue here is not whether people (those making the judgement) have the
correct or incorrect records of history; rather, the issue is that personhood necessarily
involves the past and the evaluation of how one conducted herself in it. Therefore, to
judge one to be a person is to make a moral judgement about one’s past conduct and
to validate it as morally acceptable. So, the idea of personhood is a past sensitive and
tracking moral notion. Central to this kind of historical analysis of the agent’s performance
is the assumption that she is a moral agent and one can, therefore, be taken to be morally
responsible. This kind of moral evaluation will also look into how she has conducted and
responded to social relationships, wherein she was challenged to be better, enabled by the
community to achieve her goal and to live harmoniously with others.
In the light of the above, we can safely submit that the idea of personhood imagines a
backward-looking moral orientation. The fact that the idea of personhood entails a back-
ward-looking moral orientation or, more appositely, one that takes seriously consider-
ations of the past in its moral reckoning, should come as no surprise. It is also strongly
hinted by the high regard African people usually attach to old age (Wiredu 1996; Bell
and Metz 2011). The assumption here is that the longer one lives on earth the wiser
she becomes. Menkiti (2004, 325, emphasis mine) captures this insight thus: ‘The thinking
here is that in the normal process of growth and maturation, the heart does grow increas-
ingly wiser, morally speaking. But it all takes time, and there are no short cuts… ’. Further-
more, Menkiti also notes:
The reason for this is that morality and the maturation of the human person are so intimately
bound up that a still evolving specimen of the person, lacking a full record in the area of lived
experience, would be hard-pressed to present the sort of personal history needed for an
elevation into the status of a moral exemplar (325–326).
So, the idea is that the more/longer one lives, she is presented with many opportunities to
learn many lessons for her heart to be pure and her mind to be wiser and so grow to
become one characterised by moral excellence.9 These many opportunities also equally
present many temptations for an agent to fail. But, those agents that succeed receive
the honour and respect they deserve; that of personhood. Thus, the past is a crucial
facet of the ethical system embodied by the idea of personhood that highly prizes
every human being for their capacity for moral agency and shows great respect for
those moral agents who uses their moral agency to develop moral virtue. Below, I
proceed to articulate how this idea of personhood requires particular goods for it to be
possible.
Personhood and historical conditions
Related to this important facet of the past tracking nature of the judgement regarding the
quality or defective nature of one’s deportment is what I referred to above as socio-histori-
cal conditions. By this, I mean specifically, that there are particular conditions/goods that
are necessary or even required for an agent to be able to self-realise. In other words, it
would be unjust and unreasonable for one to expect human beings to self-realise under
social circumstances that render such a goal impossible. To talk even of the possibility
of personhood or to even assume the role of evaluating human conduct with the aim
of making the judgement regarding the quality of their conduct implies the existence
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of a particular set of conditions that render this judgement reasonable in the first place. I
think this submission is vital and worth taking seriously and I am convinced it is entailed by
the idea of personhood.
It is crucial to note that central to the concept of personhood is the idea that a just
society is one that is conducive for one and all to exercise their humanity so as to
realise its true potential, to live a genuine or even a full human life. In other words, it
will be irrational for one to expect a human being to attain personhood in an environment
that is unconducive for self-perfection like when one has been dispossessed of the
material goods that make life possible; when one’s culture that buttresses the confidence
to be a self with a sense of one’s history and destiny is questioned and systematically
denied; and when one is denied the dignity that naturally belong to her merely
because she is human (Praeg 2014).
So, the political dimensions of the idea of personhood are that there are conditions that
are absolutely necessary for one to be able to lead a morally genuine life. Here, what is
imagined is the relationship between the kind of a thing a human being is and the
kinds of goods required for personhood to be possible. On the one hand, a human
being is thought to be special because she has the capacity for virtue. This idea is suc-
cinctly captured by Gyekye (1992, 110) in this manner: ‘every individual is capable of
becoming a person inasmuch as he has capacity for virtue—for performing morally
right actions—and should be treated (at least potentially) as a morally responsible agent’.
Fundamental to note in Gyekye’s thinking, is the idea that every human being has
the ontological equipment that specifies them as equal to every other human being
and as moral agents like any other human being irrespective of their class or race.
This idea that human beings have the capacity for virtue specifies the intrinsic features
that render human beings as superlatively valuable or as bearers of dignity (Darwall
1977). This talk of the human capacity for virtue captures the facet of human nature
around which the entire political system of Afro-communitarianism revolves, which spe-
cifies in virtue of what human beings are equal and informs our moral belief on person-
hood as a proper moral ideal for human beings. In Gyekye’s thinking, what makes
human beings special, if we take the idea of personhood qua character perfection
seriously, it is their ‘innate capacity for virtue, for performing morally right actions
and therefore should be treated as a morally responsible’ (Gyekye 1992, 110). A
human being is morally special, thus deserving moral recognition, because they have
the capacity for virtue. The implication of understanding human nature in this
manner implies that we require a political system that respects this human capacity
for virtue. The aim of morality and politics is to organise society in ways that allows
the human being to be able to realise this capacity that is definitive of their humanity
and its ideals.
However, it is not enough for us to recognise that human nature is special, because it
has this capacity for virtue; more is required for us to have a robust moral-political system.
The kind of a thing a human being is—one with the capacity for virtue— further requires
certain goods which are conducive for her to function in the world. If a human being is a
particular sort of a thing, with particular kinds of capacities, it should follow that she
requires certain enabling conditions and goods to be able to self-realise. Generally,
these conditions and goods in Afro-communitarian thought are captured in terms of
the ‘common good’ (Gyekye 1992, 2004; Wiredu 1992). The idea of the common good
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is usually captured by appeal to the Siamese crocodile with two heads and one stomach.
Gyekye (2010) comments thus on this moral imagery:
The part of the motif relevant to moral thought is the single stomach… The common
stomach… indicates that at least the basic interests of all the members of the community are
identical. It can therefore be interpreted to be symbolizing… the good of all the individuals
within a society.
The idea of the common good is predicated on the idea that humanity is a property shared
commonly by all human beings. This idea of the common good presupposes that there are
certain basic needs/goods that are necessary for a human life to be possible (Gyekye 2004).
This idea of the common good insists that there are core interests whose fulﬁlment is a
basic requirement of each and every human being, otherwise, life would be handicapped
or unfortunate. It is for this reason that in another place Gyekye (1997, 67) refers to them as
‘human goods’. These basic goods cover political institutions and other necessary social
facets required for a human life to be possible. I call this the common good condition.
This condition is crucial because it is reﬂective of the communitarian orientation of
African ethics rather than an individualistic orientation, which will emphasise individual
human differences and rights (Gyekye 2004).
What is beginning to emerge is that the idea of personhood is built on a particular
moral-political philosophy. Firstly, this system requires that we understand the kind of a
thing a human being is (one characterised by capacities for virtue). Secondly, it also
expects to understand the history (the context within which the agent exercises her
humanity and where the judgement regarding her performance is made) and the histori-
cal conditions (to consider whether the agent has access to basic human goods necessary
for her to develop her humanity – the common good). Without these conditions, human
life is crippled and rendered almost impossible. The concept of personhood as an achieve-
ment depends on these facets, which account for a just society. Therefore, it is safe to
submit: a just society is one that respects human beings in the light of their capacity for
virtue and one that maximises social, political and economic resources for one to be
able to self-realise. I turn now to consider the question of rectification justice.
Personhood and rectification justice
The process of colonisation and apartheid (in the case of South Africa) disturbed both of
these crucial conditions for personhood to be possible. Central to these historical pro-
cesses was (1) the denial of the humanity of African people (capacity for virtue) and (2)
the common goods necessary for them to live a robust human life and self-realise were
effectively removed. Colonisation halted the possibility and prospects of a black humanity
both as individuals and a collective to develop. The systematic denial of the humanity of
blacks and the almost complete removal of necessary goods to make human life possible
marks a great injustice against the humanity of black people and its possibilities.
The great injustice committed against African people can best be understood in terms
of being plucked out of the domain of morality. To deny human beings, their humanity
and the goods necessary for them to develop as human beings is tantamount to rendering
them ‘amoral’ in two crucial ways. Firstly, you treat them as things, i.e. as outside of the
scope of moral-political concern. As they are outside of the moral community; they are
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either transferred to the inferior animal kingdom or they are treated as moving things.
Human beings reduced to this level of existence cannot be wronged, made worse off,
and by treating them anyhow one is not doing something wrong, flouting some moral
principle (Metz 2012b). Put simply, they are put outside of the moral community, and,
as such, they are outside of the protection offered by morality.10 The second sense of
their ‘amoral’ status involves the fact they are put in an existence where they are
beyond the reach of the moral judgement where they can either be considered as
persons or not. In other words, not only have they lost all considerations of moral status
that would naturally demand that they are equal to every other human being; but they
have lost the opportunity for them to be directors of their own humanity to lead it to
self-realise or make the best of it. The moral goal of self-realisation is no longer a consider-
ation available to them, because the common good requirement was seriously under-
mined by the historical processes of colonisation. African people in a state of denied
humanity and removal of social arrangements necessary for humanity to be possible
are subjected to an engineered perpetual state of moral bad ‘luck’.
Thus, rectification justice matters on the moral idea of personhood because it should
look into reversing the disturbance of these two conditions – human equality/dignity
and common good – necessary for human life to be possible. The unjust acquisitions
and transfers must be revisited for the sake of normalising conditions for humanity to
be possible for African people. Hence, there must be a deep investigation into the past
so that we can correct or even remove all socio-political technologies put in place to
ensure the extirpation of conditions that continue to make human life impossible for
African peoples. The greatest challenge and goal of rectification justice is to re-insert
African people into the realm of morality, where they can freely and fully exercise their
humanity and be put in a position where they can either be criticised or praised for
making something of their humanity. So, central to the idea of personhood with
regards to rectification justice is a call for correcting the past to create a social-world
where morality is a possibility for African peoples.
This normalising of conditions as the necessary facet of rectification justice involves
essentially re-ordering society such that it enables all human beings to be able to function,
or to self-realise. In other words, according to personhood, the aim of rectification justice is
not necessarily to revert to the original situation.11 The aim, rather, of justice is captured by
these two facets of personhood: (1) to create a world where the humanity of all, the
oppressed and oppressor, is equally recognised and respected for its capacity for virtue
and, (2) to create conditions where all the basket of goods, be they social, political and
economic arrangements, are available to each and all so that they are in a position to
self-realise. The goal of this moral-political system is the attainment of perfection.
Injustices of the past had put African peoples, in particular, in a position where they may
not be able to live according to the ideals associated with what is ideal for their humanity –
personhood. The aim of rectification justice, then, is to rectify a society that undermines
human capacities for virtue and to create one that allows human beings, if they so will,
to pursue ideals associated with their humanity. Priority will be placed on African
peoples as they were victims of injustices, but the ultimate goal is the equalisation of
the moral platform for all to be able to self-realise.12
To give concreteness to this vision of rectification justice, I take as an example, the dif-
ficult question of land. Central to keep in mind according to personhood is that it operates
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on a completely different moral logic when it comes to questions of land ownership. In the
discourse of personhood, the land is not imagined within the Western strictures of private
property. In the first instance, the land is generally owned in common. Metz (2007, 325) is
correct to observe that
In many traditional African societies land is ultimately owned in common and it is held that
labour should be undertaken for the sake of the community, neither in order to make a
profit in light of demand nor simply to care for one’s immediate family.
The land question is a complex one, and I will not attempt to settle it in few sentences. But,
with regards to personhood, one central contribution this discourse can make is to rethink
the question in ways that are beneﬁcial to all. As such, personhood, in the ﬁrst instance,
will seriously challenge the dominant logic of thinking of our relation to land as a
private property, particularly where it has implications as a resource that can beneﬁt all.
Secondly, personhood will insist on the distribution of land in ways that will optimise its
value for the community as a whole. In other words, in this interpretation, rectiﬁcation
justice will approach the land question, not with an eye single to returning land to its orig-
inal historical patterns of ownership as a priority. Rather, the solution that emerges will
involve distributing and utilising it for the beneﬁt of all. To talk of ‘beneﬁt’, in this instance,
includes using the land for settlement, agricultural and cultural purposes – the grounding
moral motif to this approach to land and our relationship to it is that it is part of the
common good, which should be used to enable individuals to self-realise.
As such, the greatest challenge and goal posed by rectification justice construed in the
light of the Afro-communitarian moral notion of personhood requires re-insertion of
African people into the realm of morality, where they can freely and fully exercise their
humanity and be put in a place where they can either be criticised or be praised for
making something of their humanity. So, central to the idea of personhood with
regards to rectification justice is a call for correcting the past to create a social-world
where morality is a possibility, not just for African people, but for all human beings in
societies that have an ugly history of injustices. We cannot talk of a brotherhood of all
humanity and shared humanity unless we imagine a world where we recognise the
humanity of all for its capacity for virtue and we equally provide the common goods for
humanity to able to flourish (Praeg 2014).
Conclusion
In this article, I revisited Afro-communitarianism in terms of the notion of personhood to
shed light on how it will approach historical injustices. Two central facets of personhood
were brought to our attention: (1) what renders human beings morally special – their
capacity for virtue and (2) the set of goods necessary for a human being to be able to func-
tion. I argued that these two facets are at the heart of the moral-political scheme of Afro-
communitarianism. A just society is one that respects human beings in virtue of their
capacity for virtue and one that provides goods necessary for them to be able to lead a
robust life, one that can self-realise. The aim of rectification justice is ensuring that
these two conditions prevail for all humanity to be able to self-realise. The aim of rectifica-
tion justice is to create those conditions necessary for (all) human beings to be able to self-
realise. In a very rough way, I suggested that a rectificative approach to the question of
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land requires a re-distribution of it that ultimately optimises conditions for the self-realis-
ation of all humanity.
Notes
1. I am using Nozick’s entitlement conception of justice because I am ultimately interested in
addressing historical injustices. Surely, there are many ways to address historical injustices, I
rely on the idea of ‘rectification justice’ for heuristical purposes to give us some sense of think-
ing about how to address historical injustices. As such, I am not committed to this idea for its
own sake or even the entire political edifice within which Nozick imagines it. I think it is one
useful way, heuristically, to think about past injustices in light of an influential African ethical
concept of personhood.
2. Jason Van Niekerk’s (2013) doctoral thesis does a good job of defending this position in
African ethics.
3. I am aware that Thad Metz (2011, 2013) does touch on addressing historical injustices and he
insists that past injustices ought to be a feature of a robust moral theory. It is important,
however, to note that in these articles Metz is not directly discussing the question of addressing
historical injustices per se, but is ultimately showcasing that his theory does a better job than
that of Wiredu, because it has the corpus to include past considerations in its moral purview.
My aim just is to reveal the moral resources inherent in this idea of personhood to address his-
torical injustices. Further, Metz takes a rights-based approach to address historical injustices.
Elsewhere, I have argued that rights are incompatible with much of African moral-political think-
ing, particularly the moral logic inherent in the idea of personhood (Molefe 2017a). Elsewhere, I
also argued that the theory that Metz relies on to address historical injustices is implausible, and,
as such, if I am correct, it should not be taken seriously (Molefe 2017b).
4. Stephen Darwall’s (1977) article ‘Two Kinds of Respect’ anticipates the distinction between
these patient-centred and agent-centred notions of personhood. For a brilliant distinction
between these two concepts of personhood, see Behrens (2013) article ‘Two Normative Con-
ceptions of Personhood’.
5. A cautious reader will note, however, that the entire article tethers the patient-centred and the
agent-centred notions of personhood in its approach to questions of justice.
6. See Gyekye’s (1992) analysis of Afro-communitarianism.
7. I adopted this example from Metz (2013).
8. Think of act-utilitarianism, for example: the right action is defined as one that maximizes
certain outcomes in the future (MacNaughton and Rawling, 2006). If I make a promise or
even take a loan, when the time to fulfil my promise or to pay may dues, the most
important consideration is not the mere fact that I promised (backward-looking moral
logic) but rather what course of action(s) will maximise the good (forward-looking
moral logic).
9. I will not here burden myself with the question of whether this necessarily implies that chil-
dren are less moral than adults or they are merely untested or they are amoral. I would
favour a position that considers them relative to their experience. But, I need not have
answers to this question since it does affect my conclusions.
10. It is crucial that the social–political arrangements that are put in place ensure their amorality.
11. The reason for this is that the aim is a just society, and not correcting history for the sake of
correcting history. Also, the reason is that the oppressor and the oppressed are both human;
and, as such, both require conditions conducive for human beings to self-realize. The goal is
putting in place an order conducive for all humanity to flourish.
12. I am committed to egalitarianism.
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